TVRĐA

Walter Benjamin and Messianic Politics

Modernity ─ the Fury of Progress and the Boredom of Repetition

Published by:Žarko Paić
Date:22.11.2026.
Walter Benjamin

Walter Benjamin

Introduction

There is no doubt today: Walter Benjamin's endeavor to grasp, from the spirit of the archive and the being of construction, what time of accelerated history of extinction was in the idea of thinking-writing as a montage and assembly of "thought-images". Modernity does not stem from the aesthetic or political autonomy of what is understood as artistic production. Its essence lies in the antinomies of historical time. In 19th-century Paris, everything that combined opposing feelings came to pass. The fury of progress and the boredom of repetition, thus, form a unique set. It seems to be an understanding of the time Benjamin sought to provide in the Arcades Project/Das Passagen-Werk, addressing the decadence of the capital of European modernity at the height of its glory and imperial power, that opens one of the fundamental problems of contemporary art and the notions of politics and technology derived from it in a planetary age. Already from the ordering of concepts, a shift in the essence of modernity is evident. Only with this thought is a different view of the emergence of the "world" advanced, determined by the projection of the aesthetic power of the phantasmagoria of things themselves as commodity objects. Rank belongs to the metaphysical order of categories. However, the rank of thought cannot be without consequences for the entire social, political-ideological, moral, and cultural assemblage. It is always about how the structures and matrices of power are inscribed in the body of the collective-individual destiny of humans. Existing power in the world cannot determine thought. On the contrary, it depends on which life decisions should be made. The condition for the possibility of changing the world denotes a radical change in thinking.

Therefore, a technology for Benjamin cannot be only a consequence of the economic advancement of capitalism, but rather a thing derived from the science used in industrial production. What seems uncanny in this turn of the power of shaping the "new world" is that technology (techné) is born of the essence of art (poiesis). For this reason, it only emerges as a political rule of power outside the realm of the modern subject. On the other hand, aesthetics arose from the essence of technology. Its emergence in the new Era corresponds to the transformation of the world from the openness of Being in the construction of the subject. As cognitio sensitiva, aesthetics emerged in the 18th century in the form of a new philosophical discipline of the metaphysics of the mind. Art, thus, becomes more than the representation of the existing world. On the contrary, with aesthetics comes the age of technological construction of life. Keep this in mind, it could be easy to conclude that one must take a different view of modernity. The paradox is that this turn of the forces and powers from which the concepts, categories, and ideas of modern "progress" and "development" emerge requires a change in approach to the relation between thought and Being. In another turn, starting with Marx's dialectic of history, with which Benjamin uses his way of considering the relationship between society and culture, we can talk about an understanding of ideology. With it, capitalist modernization triumphantly rules over life in all areas. The chapter is alphabetically named D (Boredom, Eternal Recurrence), where Benjamin deals with the analysis of texts on the relationship between classical and modernity in the art of Paris, on "ornament and boredom", Blanqui's theory of the repetition of myth in the new environment of modernity, and a critique of the concept of "eternal recurrence of the equal“ (ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen) by recording the thoughts from Karl Löwith's book on Nietzsche's philosophy, we find in one place the following explanation of antinomies in the notion of time. Whether it is the "antinomies of the mind" as in Kant, or perhaps it is somewhat different in understanding the relationship between Being, time, and God, we shall leave for now that matter and return to it later. What we are interested in, first of all, is how Benjamin develops thinking about the essence of modernity from the antinomies of the time:

„The belief in progress-in infinite perfectibility understood as an infinite ethical task-and the representation of eternal return are complementary. They are the indissoluble antinomies against which the dialectical conception of historical time must be developed. In this conception, the idea of eternal return appears precisely as the "shallow rationalism" that belief in progress is accused of being, while faith in progress seems no less mythic than the idea of eternal return. [DIOa,5]. (Benjamin, 1982: 178, 1999: 119)

What makes the essence of modernity for Benjamin from the early philosophical and aesthetic standpoint on the notion of tragedy and romanticism (1916-1924) through the writings of Kafka, Baudelaire, and Surrealism (1924-1934) to the writings on artwork and technological reproducibility (1935/1936) can be found in the Arcades Project/Das Passagen-Werk (1927-1929 and 1935-1939). The answer, however, is not "flat" in lavish stylistic simplicity. All this requires an examination of the reasons for concluding that, at the level of the dispute with Goethe and the notion of symbols, a preference for allegory and the avant-garde technique of the constructive "thought-image“ (Denkbild) derives. (Hodge in Benjamin, A. (ed.) 2005: 14-31). Modernity does not give us an unambiguous answer to the question of the relationship between progress and eternal recurrence. It is antinomian thinking, and it cannot be reduced to either a logic-or or a dialectical permeation of both in the synthesis of contradiction. Modernity cannot, therefore, be, as in Adorno, a “negative dialectic” with an anti-Hegelian stance according to which truth is not whole. Instead, with Benjamin, one should think of what is at the same time a sign of logic, too, however, in such a way that neither determines the "third" beyond the dialectical synthesis of opposites. The problem, then, arises when the way of thinking that reflects on the essence of modernity becomes the sign of "mythic thinking". How can we understand the underlying problem: namely, that both perceptions (Vorstellungen) of unconditional progress and eternal recurrence are complementary yet contradictory, and that their origin might be common in "mythic thinking"?

1.1. Between Kant's and Nietzsche's legacy

Concerning a book from the inheritance, or rather an editorial endeavour, which Adorno's student Rolf Tiedemann edited and published, as an author of one of the best interpretations of Walter Benjamin's philosophical and historical thinking, (Tiedemann, 1973) who collected all this "scattered burden" of notes, editing, collections, aphorisms, quotations, bricolage reflections, descriptions, fragments about Paris from the period 1927-1929 and the second draft of sketches 1935-1939 named Das Passagen-Werk on over a thousand pages of fascinating text on the edges and palimpsests of modernity in Europe par excellence, which in English has the modern name of The Arcades Project, (Benjamin, 1999) it is commonly said that it should be understood by a "materialistic project" or by an introduction to a new notion of "cultural history". (Caygill in Benjamin, A. 2005: 73-96). In contrast to other approaches to aesthetic modernity in critical social theory, Benjamin's procedure and strategy are only similar to the almost identical thinking developed by the philosopher and art theorist Siegfried Kracauer in his essays on photography, film, and mass culture in Berlin of the same period. (Kracauer 2005) When the above-mentioned text on the antinomies of the thought of "progress" and "eternal recurrence" refers to the profanity of a time in which the mythic form bears another outfit, but still operates in the same or similar way as in the ancient age of mythic thinking, then we must ask the question: can, without further reflection, considered "faith" in progress be at the same rank as the notion of "eternal recurrence of equality", or can their opposite be derived from "sameness" in a different way of thinking? This question suggests that Benjamin identifies "progress" with the essence of modernity. Its origins date back to Kant's Enlightenment program. The fate of the world depends on perfecting humanity's cognitive and moral capabilities. Likewise, the notion of "eternal recurrence", which belongs to Nietzsche's thought and seemingly contradicts the essence of modernity, defines, paradoxically, progress as a recurrence of the "same." In Benjamin's view, this connects to the pursuit of the new. In a time of dizzyingly accelerated history, it offers a new escape from the tenacity of Being.

In this way, the problem of encountering the irreconcilable aesthetics of the beautiful in Kant and the sublime in Nietzsche opens up: that which belongs to purposefulness without purpose and the essence of art, from the very core of the creative forces of life, beyond good and evil. Although in Benjamin, we cannot explicitly find proof for reconsidering the dual legacy of aesthetics and art theory from the new Era to the outcome of modernity, except in fragmentary terms, it seems undeniable that the conflict between Kant's transcendental aesthetics is built on the principles of mind and purpose nature, and Nietzsche's legacy of romanticism. However, the thought of the artist-as-genius of the creation of life itself in Being-different (Werden) is found in an attempt at a "new" understanding of the modern world. Namely, Benjamin is developing a setting about the antinomian "nature" of modernity. As in Kafka's hero in one story, modernity is gripped by the present, as its past is portrayed as a graveyard of ruins and its future as a sign of catastrophe. We know that Benjamin's notion of history, as articulated in Historical and Philosophical Theses (1940), particularly the famous 8th Thesis, in which he interprets the allegorical meaning of Paul Klee's painting Angelus Novus, defines progress as an inevitable catastrophe. Thus, it gets around the theological notion of Jewish mysticism, such as Messianic Kairos or Now-time (Jetztzeit), to find the last chance of escape from the "one-way street". (Paić 2019; Paić, 2008: 173-191).

At the Arcade/Das Passagen-Werk level, however, the problem is viewed through the materialist aesthetics of modernity. Between "progress" and "eternal recurrence" as drivers of the machine of modernity, an interaction process unfolds. If, then, modernity has no limit in the notion of "progress" or the notion of "eternal recurrence", then where are the limits of this "project" that Benjamin, in a brilliant tone of enlightenment, carries through all the stations of the "new" ─ from art and politics to technology? The boundary lies in what happens when a gap opens between "progress" and "eternal recurrence". Of course, it cannot be determined other than ontologically and psychologically. In a chapter beginning with the letter D, Benjamin opened with a series of quotations, reflections, and thoughts by Parisian poets, bohemians, and decadents, from Baudelaire to Haussmann, and many others, on boredom. The Arcades Project/Passagen-Werk commends the spirit of modernity and the machine of progress as Marx did in the Communist Manifesto and Capital. However, if there is a significant difference, it may not lie in a change in understanding the essence of capitalism and modernity. First and foremost, it is about shifting perspective on what is central and shedding light on it differently. Rather than economics as the foundation, the ideological and cultural contours come into focus. In other words, the phantasmagoria of dialectic, or the image-thinking catalog (Denkbild), constitutes capitalism in industrial production, with Paris as the capital of the new modern culture, the capital of enchantment.[1] The enchantment-disenchantment dialectic represents the program of Benjamin's critique of the cultural-political turn of capitalism at the beginning of its ascent to the highest stage of human desire, indeed. The problem facing analyses of the enchantment-disenchantment in the transformation of the transcendental idea of capital into the immanent image-fetish of the consumer world is that we find a yawn of boredom between belief in "progress" and the idea of "eternal recurrence" (Langeweille).

What does that mean? Nothing but the new as a driver of modernity in the capitalist production of life lies in the opposite of the process of suspension and neutralization of this emptiness that provokes a sense of boredom. And boredom arises from the repetition of what has already been seen. Not only in the world of life but because repetition follows the logic of a mechanical machine and its reproducibility. Between "progress" as a belief in the perfection of infinity and "eternal recurrence" as a representation of the repetition of the same (Being) in the time of "eternal present" (nunc stans), then, we find an uncanny abyss of boredom. That would be what is forgotten when the novelty of modernity is exalted. At the same time, constantly experiencing the creative fad that produces always new objects, situations and contexts only conceals what is already transparent. So far, it lies in the void of the "new". And it comes from transforming man into a matter without substance. What does that mean? It is simply not a thing that can be taken for granted as a hammer or a pen in the human world. Now the matter has become an object. Within the network of meanings of capitalist relations created by the economic exchange in the market, its emergence is an excess. It is an artificial way of existence. The thing is created in the assemblage of fetishism. Just as there are two relations between things and nature, things and man ─ authentic and vulgar, primal and mediated ─ the same applies to two notions of time. The paradox is that modernity evolves from the antinomy of the two understandings of time. Its immanent boundary should be expressed with a feeling beyond the aesthetic-political configuration of life as such. When the difference between linearity and the circularity of time is shown by the question of the way of "mythic thinking" in modern conditions of enchantment-disenchantment of technology, then one can see from Benjamin's theory of cultural modernization that the futility of the avant-garde vision of absolute freedom of creation is derived from the essence of decadence. It is not difficult to conclude that, therefore, only one historical figure necessarily shows itself in that yawn or abyss of freedom. It is, of course, melancholy. From the early aesthetic writings on the German mourning game (Trauerspiel) to the later fragments about the Messianic event of the profane and sacred history, for Benjamin, it will be more than a function of dialectical mediation.

1.2. The construction of arcades

How is it presented so far in the "imperial panorama" of Paris in the 19th and early 20th centuries? Benjamin refers to Émile Tardieu's work entitled L'Ennui (Boredom). In it, any human activity in modern society takes place only as an "escape from boredom". Thus, for example, the routine of factory work in the discipline of performing predetermined operations required for the production of new industrial facilities appears at the same time as the "economic base of ideological boredom of the upper classes." Mechanical work resembles Sisyphus's work. (Benjamin 1982: 162. (D2a, 4) This is not merely a sociological description of the uniformity of modern technology in the work process, based on existing literature from Engels to Tardieu and others. It is equally worth avoiding the shallow portrayal of Benjamin's theory of modern art and the avant-garde as a flawed sociological, aesthetic approach that belongs, though, especially and authentically, to the mainstream of Frankfurt's critical theory. Already, Theodor W. Adorno has rightly pointed out that, in contrast to his views on aesthetic autonomy and the high modernity of art in a capitalist, alienated society, Benjamin's aesthetics was original and distinct from the current. This is important because insight into the essence of modernity comes through three conceptual constellations in late Benjamin from the late 1920s to 1940, when he committed suicide somewhere in the Pyrenees on the run from the Gestapo. Those are:

(1) Art as irreducibility of the events of "mythic thinking" in the cult and ritual of the community, with the leading notion of an aura that determines the meaning of the work;

(2) Politics as the messianic activity of "divine violence" in history based on the sovereignty and singularity of the state of exception;

(3) Technology as an inhuman machine for the reproduction of works in the age of new media (photography and film), which results in the disappearance of the origin of Being and the reorientation of life into the logic of mass construction of what is left of society.

Where does the void of freedom to initiate new events in the modern way of mass existence arise? Nowhere else than in the art, politics, and technology of life's radical aestheticization. Moreover, it is conducted as an absolute construction on the other side of the human. The masses of modern society cannot be reduced to demographics. Population growth, driven by the workforce's departure from cities as centers of industrial capitalism, is only a consequence of a single fundamental cause. It is also a condition for any future praise and criticism of modernity. Namely, it might be a change in the very essence of thinking. It no longer considers nature holy, and it can no longer be approached with an enriched, romantic-like source of inspiration. Instead, modernity marks the age of categories of thought: computation, planning, and construction. (Paić 2018) In this way, modernity constitutes the phantasmagoria of unconditional "progress" and the unwavering "eternal recurrence" of the same (Being as Being). As an escape from boredom and a search for the stability of change, everything is organized around the frantic pursuit of the "new". However, since this paradoxical desire for the stability of repetition always moves forward, in the ecstasy of the future as a delayed present, we find, in essential manifestations of modernity, the utopian field of phantasmagoria. Everything happens in the material form of the most significant reach of the aesthetic connection of symbols and allegories ─ arcades or steel structures of passage through the stations of the city and its separate zones of production and enjoyment of life. The architecture of this specific modern constellation of art, politics, and technology denotes the idea of ​​"progressiveness". Without it, there is no modernity. The leading representative of this aesthetic of avant-garde decadence or decadent avant-garde is Charles Baudelaire. Not coincidentally, for Benjamin, Baudelaire is the most significant poet of modernity, and the figure of the inhuman is central to creating an entirely new life in the imperial city of beauty and death. To understand this, we need to develop the following assumption. Unlike the philosophical concepts that sprang from Hegel to Adorno, which emerge within the framework or matrix of German metaphysics or idealism as a positive or negative dialectic, Benjamin's turn toward thinking art-politics-technology is far-reaching for the future. We can call it an aesthetic or iconic turn. The language of thought takes on the features of enchantment-disenchantment. It is like an illusionist's secret: solving the riddle of hiding what the eye cannot see. In this sense, the search for a language of non-systematic philosophy after the 1924 encounter with Parisian surrealism and the avant-garde marks a decisive step for Benjamin toward something beyond a synthesis of dialectical categories. (Tiedemann 1973: 155) The aura of poetry, in which language assumes the form of the sublime, the destruction of history, and the construction of arcades, constitutes a complementary thought or dialectical image (Denkbild).

"The dialectical image is one flashing up momentarily. It is thus, as an image flashing up in the Now of its recognisability, that the past, in this case, that of Baudelaire, can be captured. The redemption which can be carried out in this way and no other is always to be won out of the perception of that which is being lost irretrievably.” (Benjamin, 1985: 49; Jennings in S. Ferris, 2004: 18-34, and Pensky in S. Ferris, 2004: 177-198).

Its autonomy boils down to what Benjamin says in one fragment of the exact text entitled Zentralpark:

"On the melancholic's Way to Calvary (Passionsweg), the allegories are the stations of the Cross." (Benjamin, 1985, p. 36)

Let us return to Benjamin's notion of the antinomies that constitute the essence of modernity. There is no doubt that the idea of "progress" is metaphysically acquired. From the sources of Christian philosophy, history continues to the present day. St. Augustine marks a radical break with the Greek conception of the circularity of the spheres of Being. Motion in a straight line into infinity must be contradictory in itself. The reason is that the term "infinite direction" denotes something that has a beginning but no end. When something starts and ends, it is not a matter of mathematical calculation. Much more critical should be something else: the answer to the question, how is the essence of a period determined scientifically, technologically, and socio-culturally, based on the idea of ​​the "new", and whose fundamental ecstatic dimension of temporality is contained in the "present" as actuality? In the philosophical-historical sense, Benjamin sought to introduce these antinomies into a new order of meaning. Thus, in the conflict between Kant's transcendental aesthetics with his leading notion of the self-perfection of the mind in nature and Nietzsche with his "aesthetics of creativity of the artist" rather than the neutral and indifferent observer of "beauty", we find ourselves in a disconnect between the power of the imagination (Einbildungskraft) and the creative possibilities of the artist. The "faith in progress" of the Enlightenment (Kant) and the counter-Enlightenment (Nietzsche) transcend nature and mind to enter the semiotic realms of the life of Being, and cannot be resolved dialectically. This became clear to Benjamin in the late 1930s. That is why, from texts on Baudelaire and surrealism, the problem of works of art and the reproducibility of technology, to the last works of the Messianic salvation from the catastrophe of history, he devoted himself to reflecting on and seeking what medieval theology renounced as an option by saying tertium non datur. The problem he addressed within the horizon of modernity's antinomies in the Arcades Project/Das Passagen-Werk and the texts on Baudelaire and melancholy also has far-reaching significance for modernity. At one point in the Zentralpark text, he says:

"Eternal return is an attempt to link the two antinomic principles of happiness with one another: namely, that of eternity and that of the yet once again. ─ The idea of ​​eternal recurrence conjures out of the Misère (wretchedness) of (the) time the speculative idea (or the phantasmagoria) of happiness. Nietzsche's heroism is the counterpart to Baudelaire's, which, arising from the wretchedness of philistine routine, conjures the phantasmagoria of modernity.

The concept of progress should be grounded in catastrophe. That things 'just go on' is the catastrophe. It is not what is approaching, but what is. Strindberg's thought: Hell is not something that lies ahead of us, but life here. (Benjamin 1985: 50)

1.3. Now-time (Jetztzeit)

There is something truly enigmatic about Benjamin's entire undertaking of a materialistic theory of society and art, culminating in the antinomian "project of modernity". Notably, the original title of Arcades Project/Das Passagen-Werk was Paris Arcade. Dialectical Feérie. As Margaret Cohen explains, and as Rolf Tiedemann reliably traces, the proof appears in alphabetical order, C, 322. (Cohen in Benjamin, A. 2005: 203) Significantly, the word/term feérie appeared in Paris around 1823. It refers to a successful theatre performance in the mid-19th century. These "fairy tales" featured supernatural characters. Elaborate mechanical effects have underscored their exceptional capacity to elicit admiration and fear in the audience. New technologies of industrial production in 19th-century capitalism, such as photography, the diorama, the panorama, and the wax figure museum, in new ways connected myth and reality, mysticism and demystification, and the human need for sublimity. For Benjamin, therefore, the problem of the modern way of producing life in all aspects of manifestation appears to be an antinomic and ambivalent whole of transcendence and immanence, of mysticism and technology. None of these traditional philosophical concepts disappeared after 1924; rather, Benjamin chose new aesthetic forms instead of the rigor of "scientific" discussion: the fragment, montage, allegory, a kind of avant-garde patchwork, and romanticism as a source of inspiration. However, nothing can be reduced to other fundamentals. Any reductivism loses its original meaning. To understand pleasure, the will to power, and the boredom of a new era in Western history, one must always keep the logic of the substitute in mind. The transformation of the old into the new, the archaic into the modern, always indicates a change in the supreme signifying. Modernity is not merely a new myth of the demise of science and technology as an industry. On the contrary, it formally recalls a mythic proverb in another language. If the discourse of the technical period begins to change, then we face a reshaping of the myth's form itself. For this reason, the testimony of the surrealist poet Louis Aragon on modernity as a "new mythic language" must be taken seriously in other respects. In this way, comparisons between Benjamin's small "cultural history" in the Arcades/Das Passagen-Werk and Barthes's Myths à la mode can be drawn. However, something curious about Benjamin's notion of the antinomy of progress-repetition and ambivalence appears in the dialectical figures he employs in his analysis of the anatomy of modern culture. We have seen from the passage in Zentralpark quoted that Nietzsche and Baudelaire differ in opposing "heroism. More importantly, something else should exist. By citing Strindberg, Benjamin changes his usual view of history as a catastrophe. Progress can no longer be determined by the promise of everlasting happiness in an endless series of Now-time (Jetztzeit). Instead of linear progress that still allows the illusion of a utopian, constructed future, everything is directed toward an actualized "present." Unlike modernity as a utopia (future), this second vision or conception of the essence of modernity is based on an apocalyptic image of destiny. Progress, therefore, should be reflected in the image of disaster. It is the image that hides behind the fantasy of success, happiness, and wealth, the dark shadow of the decomposition of all beings. However, why do we often characterize progress as a disaster? Benjamin does not prove "rational" in his mystical-messianic style of aphoristic stylistics. We do not know if this is because the essence of progress in the scientific and technical mix denotes ​​the Being as an enframing (Gestell), as Heidegger would radically rethink it in the 1940s (Heidegger, 2009), or, rather, it is something that has its origins in the ideas of Adorno and Horkheimer, that is, the critical theory of society. However, the critique of the Enlightenment myth regarding the founders of the Institute for Social Research's progress was radicalized in 1947 with the publication of The Dialectic of Enlightenment (Dialektik der Aufklärung). (Adorno and Horkheimer 1988)

From Benjamin's lavish array of figures and thought fragments in the wake of Marx and surrealism, Nietzsche and decadence, romanticism and avant-garde, it is not entirely clear what or who represents the condition of the possibility of disaster. The reason is that his thought cannot be unequivocally derived from the philosophy of history, the aesthetics of romanticism, or the dialectical "tiger leap" into the new cultural indeterminism. If so, Benjamin's non-systematic thinking must be approached precisely to enable systematic rethinking, as Rolf Tiedemann did consistently at first. If the law of causality (cause-and-effect), which Nietzsche and Kierkegaard have already questioned, no longer holds, we face a fundamentally different understanding of space and time. Unlike the traditional Kantian transcendental aesthetic, we enter the realms of indetermination. It seems as if what has adorned the entire history of metaphysics ─ order, rank, hierarchy, causality, harmony, verticality, eternity ─ is on the path of landing. Therefore, it would be appropriate to make assumptions about the "deconstructive" reading of Hegel and Mainnto Benjamin. The choice of fragment and aphorism, rather than speculative thinking of the whole, denotes a descent into the "underground". What began with Benjamin at the end of European high modernism seems to offer an alternative to the narrative of the spirit's journey toward the self-realization of the absolute, which, with Hegel, culminates in philosophy as a figure of absolute science. The edges of the whole and small histories of almost insignificant transients, such as fashion, advertising, and entertainment, have now gained a voice in a multitude of new discursive practices. However, there's no denying that even in its most important documents, in the context of "classical" philosophical discourse, the Origin of German Trauerspiel (Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels) from 1928 does not introduce concepts and categories known from contemporary complexity theory, such as singularity, heterogeneity, set of conditions, and constellations. (Benjamin 2000; Steiner Uwe 2010: 63-72)

Why should progress be condemned to be the downfall of the human and natural world? Does this mean that modernity denotes a state without an autonomous structure that protects it from external damage and the possibility of moving into a completely different condition, from "progress" to "backward" as the apocalyptic abyss of the end of history?

1.4. Constellations and Illuminations

The turning (Umschwung) versus Hegel's project of the wholeness of the whole in the form in which the history of the spirit resides as an absolute is explicitly articulated in Walter Benjamin's last essay, Theses on the Philosophy of History (Über den Begriff der Geschichte). (Benjamin 1968: 253-264) The eighteen theses propose that, as a method for understanding history, Marx's historical materialism can be appropriately developed in the study of capitalism only when the principle of montage is introduced into modernity, in the complexity of the social relations among economics, politics, and culture. This avant-garde "invention" cannot reduce the singularity of the historical movement to the abstract strata of the universality of the concepts and categories of "science" that govern the web of reality. Instead, only by installing or assembling irreducible causes and effects can one grasp the wealth of the "little one" as a whole. In the labyrinth of events, each act forms a "crystal of the events of the whole." (Benjamin, 1982:570). (N2, 6).

This "crystallization method" is based on the premise that the irreducibility of the singular Being as becoming is fundamental. It is not surprising, therefore, that some theorists are trying to relate Benjamin to Deleuze today. The reason is that, in both cases, the concepts of constellation and assemblage suggest a departure from metaphysical thinking. At the same time, the thinking cannot be oriented towards the already constant Being. The possibility of continuous change is at work. The assemblages of culture and becoming (Werden, devenir) testify, indeed, to the continuous change in the constellations of relations. (Paić 2013) If history, then, should be understood as change becoming new, then we need a principle that lets us grasp the complex reality shaped by the unconditional progress of modern times.

In this consideration, I, therefore, put into motion the concepts and categories of history framing. Benjamin sought the "logic of the new principle" beyond the classical dialectic (positive or negative). Montage-in-history denotes the creative principle of finding the reasons and conditions for creating something new. In the constant passage or oscillation between the belief in furious "progress" and the boredom of repeating "eternal recurrence", it is re-published as "profane illumination". This means that history is not merely a progression towards inevitable ruin. This would be a naive, catastrophic vision of a mystical revolutionary. The nexus of Jewish eschatological apocalypticism and the Marxist critique of culture in modern capitalism should be understood against the backdrop of the "end of history" and the contours of the arrival of "The Day After". Indeed, this should be resisted by the following insight. Namely, Benjamin, like an "uncontemporary Contemporain", understands history through the complex singularity of events. That is why it very often indicates the ineffectiveness of the law of causality. No single cause gives rise to many consequences; instead, many causes produce a multitude of effects. In this event, not every monad of the living mirrors the universal order of the universe, as in the pantheism of Spinoza's infinite substance. I intend to approach the analysis of Benjamin "today" from his inner and imminent modernity. An attempt is made to develop thinking as an assemblage of art, politics, and technology in the constellations of relations of society-culture. If something has a surrogate status of a quasi-transcendental cause/condition, it exists only as a relation. It is therefore a circuit of Being as an event, suggesting that change cannot be conceived only as a concept of nature but also as a concept of spirit; consequently, constellations of constancy and permanence are reduced to the temporality and changeability of their existence. The set is what is born of romanticism: art functions as an organon of philosophy. But in the 20th century, it emerged through political and technological forms as an aesthetic configuration of life's power. The assemblage, therefore, does not determine the "causal" constellation of forces, because the relationship between the assemblage's elements is not defined in a straight line. The constellation, by contrast, marks the event horizon in which art, politics, and technology take place in modern times. This happens through the features of an open process.[2] What, for Benjamin's montage-in-history, is the guiding principle of the complex indeterminacy of a contingent event whose outlines of the new are recognized through messianic niches of other and different histories (utopias)? Yes, this is the "technology" of cognitive-critical philosophizing, with key terms such as aura, allegory, image-thinking, dialectical image, and principles of construction.

Every encounter with Benjamin as a "philosopher" represents both an aporia and a paradox. This applies to philosophy on the fringes of theology and cultural history, as well as to literature. In the form of an essay, it merges the incompatible ─ a lifelong fragment of a sense of time and experience of space. Time is understood by reflecting on the events of "life." It would be easy to proclaim this thought as a philosophical essayist, as the cynical university professors of philosophy would, just as the philistine blacksmith knows, saying there is only one in a series of highly learned "writers". But the problem becomes much more serious. When it is known that despite several stations on the "cross path of melancholy", Benjamin himself, in his chosen and rigorously performed discourses, spoke and thought "the same," it must give his thought a rank equivalent to the reach of Adorno's speculativeness. (Adorno 1970) But without the pathos of the pre-guaranteed right to speak of Being and time on the horizon of modernity, with progress and the apocalypse belonging to philosophy. If Heidegger's remark in Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) about Kierkegaard as a "religious writer" rather than a philosopher seems at the same time appropriate and scandalous, then it could rightly be said of Benjamin. Let us say at the outset that he is a contemporary thinker-writer whose work evokes a melancholy beauty. That thinking becomes a set of irreducible differences across the multitude of constellations of the relationship among Being, God, the world, and man. He who thinks from the abyss of language passes through uncanny layers of images. Their presence in living within the boundaries of modern physicality manifests in the profane forms of happiness and serenity, and in the trauma and sad memory of the loss of origin, in the love and freedom of the individual. In the realm of the enchantment-disillusionment of modernity as endless pleasure and endless boredom, there is no downtime. Writing does not string metaphors and symbols together to obscure reality. When the language of thought reaches the highest pinnacles of poetry and philosophy, we blend with the unspeakable that lies beyond language and image. It becomes obvious, therefore, why Benjamin chose for his thought figures not concepts and categories, but those that, from German Baroque to Jewish mysticism, aimed to undermine the ruling order of the metaphysics of the mind. One fragment of the Arcade/Passagen-Werk, which describes the assembly method as a contribution to the dialectical thinking of the "cultural history" of modernity in the wake of Marx, also contains a far-reaching assumption, akin to the late Wittgenstein's Sprachspiele in language theory. It was expressed as a reflection on the idea of ​​progress and the method of historical analysis of the present. The assemblage of a new whole from different autonomous parts, which are neither functions nor structures, becomes more than a found new way of thinking-writing "about" what is happening in and with reality. Although it denotes an invention of origin in the technique of surrealist painting (assemblage), particularly developed in the work of Belgian painter René Magritte, in the textual order of fragments Benjamin attributes to it the meaning of the emergence of "thought-image" (Denkbild):

" Method of this project: literary montage. I needn't say anything. Merely show. I shall purloin no valuables, appropriate no ingenious formulations. But the rags,

the refuse-these I will not inventory but allow, in the only way possible, to come

into their own: by making use of them."(Benjamin, Das Passagen-Werk, 574, 1999: 460 (NI a, 8)

The method and the anti-systemic "system" of this thought focus on trying to bring the Being as an assemblage of art, politics, and technology, and time as a constellation of socio-cultural relations, out of a reflection on what is happening "here" and "now" (space-time). Progress is the essence of modernity in the categories of space and time. The first denotes the dynamics of movements of capital in the aesthetic, political, and technological way of latent mobilization; to the other belongs the development and unfolding in the ecstasy of the present (Jetztzeit), in which, at the same time, it manifests that nunc stans (eternal presence) as the kairos of time and the whole of the future from the utopian construction of the present. Hence, in Benjamin, imaginative images carry the temporal character of the "moment" (Augenblick). In a flash, an image precedes a word. What is perceived in time refers to the possibility of repetition in memory. It's not hard to see why the Book of Paris focuses so much on the notion of phantasmagoria. This by no means implies a psychoanalytic understanding of the phantasm in Freud. If there is, however, any further connection with the theory of the unconscious, then it is correlated with dreams and trauma. As the dream emerges in the dimension of the collective unconscious, morphé culture, between belief in progress and the mythic notion of eternal recurrence, trauma opens the space for the inevitable catastrophe of modernity, as Benjamin pointed out in the Zentralpark text fragment, which deals with Baudelaire and Strindberg. What connects dream and trauma is precisely the phantasmagoria of ready-mades or aesthetic objects, as Marcel Duchamp would say. The thing is the fetishized death of the organic. Only in the encounter with the inhuman does modern art and the avant-garde construction of a technical object take place as nihilism. (Paić 2021)

1.5. The empty temporality of progress

Without repetition, the time of furious progress remains empty. The empty temporality of progress, therefore, leaves modernity at the mercy of a homogeneous and empty space. It must be filled with the "events" of history, big and small. But in doing so, it becomes clear that the relation between "big" and "small" cannot be a matter of quantity, but of the relational aesthetics of dynamic quantities. At the heart of "great history" lies the idea and reality of the "progress" of economics and politics; on the fringes of "small history", the irresistibility of culture from the world of life flourishes. Therefore, the image of 19th-century Paris as an "imperial panorama" may fit the city's spatiotemporal fabric, within which modernity assumes a political-cultural grandeur. The aura of a frozen history reconciles the spirit of construction and melancholy with the lost past. What is lacking in all his descriptions and analyses of modernity appears in Marx's Capital, where London became the 19th-century world city of industrial capitalism. It lacks, conditionally, the structure and infrastructure of capitalism without ornament, modernity without sublimity (Erhabenheit) ─ economics in the axiomatic sense of the machine of social relations. Benjamin, therefore, refers not so much to Marx's notion of the fetishism of goods as the secrets or mysteries of alienation between man and nature, man and man, but to the study of Marxist dialectics by George Lukács in History and Class Consciousness (Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein) of 1927. It examines the reification of relations within the capitalist social order. The difference between alienation and reification denotes the ontological difference between the essence of labor and capitalist production. Its origins date back to Hegel's speculative-dialectical logic of history and Feuerbach's anthropological critique of Christianity. But Lukács goes a step further: the necessity now becomes transforming the social relations of labor alienation into the reification of object goods. This would certainly be closer to how we understand capitalism in the 20th century. (Lukacs 1972; Pensky in Benjamin, A. 2005: 177-195; Tiedemann 1973, 128-166).

However, this "flaw" requires Benjamin to develop the wonderfully picturesque Mappa Mundi of worldwide capitalism. A secret code lies hidden in the city's archives as a work of art/event. We have deliberately adopted the familiar syntagm of the romantic art historian Jacob Burckhardt, but with a different subject of reflection here. Of course, it is Paris' "arcade" as a modern wandering stage of subject/actor theatricalization (flaneur). With it, the high culture of pleasure in art begins and ends. On its ruins and traces, however, a "society of the spectacle" is formed. This term already contains art's changed meaning. In Guy Debord's situationist neo-avant-garde, the image as ideology becomes a flywheel in the closed system of capitalist mediation, serving to enchant reality. The "progress" now denotes that the reification of social relations represents a condition for the emergence of a media construction of the world. This is, at the same time, a step beyond the assumption that shows the technological features of the new mediascape. (Debord 1995; Paić 2013: 433-482) Benjamin's book titled Arcades/Das Passagen-Werk states nothing. But that's why it shows how transparent things are in the world. Moreover, it is a book of "thought-images," a montage of past and future, grounded in the irreducibility and paradoxical, aporetic baselessness of that temporal dimension, which is all the more transient when emptied of the sense of wholeness and reduced to the "empty homogeneity" of time. It is about the present as actuality in a yawn that is shed by the uncanny emptiness of events, and the resulting experience of boredom. Speaking as opposed to showing denotes an activity of language. When language no longer opens up the possibilities of telling the Being itself, the image of language as text comes into play. The image replaces the language. It does so by showing the way out of the maze of a closed system of meaning. In other words, Benjamin seeks to show that the age of the rule of the image (Bild) as reproductive technology should be becoming. Art moves with it into a new form of existence. Instead of saying "about" the Being as a lasting reality, we have a show of events. In its creation and disappearance, everything moves along the lines of Being/becoming. (Mersch 2002)

What Benjamin bestowed on all his predecessors as the essence of modernity is the assemblage of archaic and modern aspirations for the mythic enchantment of reality. Paris is just that ─ the mythic city of construction as enchantment and the space-time of the disenchantment of progress. Behind masks and the apparent lavishness of "life," everything takes place within a circle of seemingly predetermined possibilities. No one has succeeded in bringing this to the idea of the Book in the editing of collections and scraps, quotes and notes, pictures and catalogs, advertising texts and records on the fringes of universal cartography and the archives of modern history, as Walter Benjamin did. The paradox, then, is that the two German Jews are paradigmatically speculative-reflexive portraitists and chroniclers of the two world-historical cities of modern capitalism ─ Marx to London, and Benjamin to Paris. What represents the anatomy of the Capital for the economics of 19th-century industrial modernity, denotes the Das Passagen-Werk for the culture of modernism and the avant-garde of the 19th and 20th centuries. Where in all this lies the politics? For Marx, in continuing economics, and for Benjamin, in extending culture by other means. But for Marx, culture is not merely an ideology of the economic base (Unterbau), nor should, for Benjamin, an economy denote a mere base as a condition for the existence of a phantasmagoria appropriate to the early stages of industrial capitalism. In both cases, the political lacks "sovereignty" and "autonomy". Contrary to the efforts of Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt, when it comes to the irreducibility of the notion of the political and politics concerning economics, science, morals, and culture, Benjamin, like Marx, but from a different thinking horizon, decides to think the difference between the profane and the sacred, the Angel of history and the Messiah of events, as the mystic of revolutionary "divine violence". We will examine how this can develop within the project of overcoming or ending the epochal boundary of modern capitalism. What, after all, should be his thinking of the political close and at the same time distant from Marx's radical communist revolution of the world? Let us return, for a moment, to what seems to be decisive in the whole structure of thinking from which the Arcades/Das Passagen-Werk originated. It is, of course, the use of "dialectical images“ (dialectic Denkblid).

It must be said immediately that every thought-picture is not dialectical. Still, in its reflexivity, not speculativeness, it must be understood from the paradoxes and aporias of historical dialectics, or modes of thought, originating in Hegel and Marx. As much as Benjamin moves within the horizon of Marx's "historical materialism" by adding his peculiar theological (Jewish) mysticism, he is so self-assured that he does not address the origin of dialectics in Hegel as systematically as Adorno did in his "negative dialectics". (Adorno 1980, 2003) This can be seen as a defect in historical and philosophical terms. However, this can be justified by the fact that, in understanding modern art, politics, and technology, Benjamin takes a different path from the usual one. This is how dialectic shifts to a theological-messianic notion of the impossibility of revolution as "dialectical progress." As relevant interpretations of Adorno and Tiedemann showed, and many recent ones such as the contributions of Uwe Steiner and Samuel Weber (Steiner, 1983, pp. 43-88; Weber, S., 2008: 227-280). It is evident that, at the time of the first and second outbursts of the late Benjamin's thinking (1935 and 1939) in the Arcades Project/Das Passagen-Werk fragments, as well as in the last texts on the concept of history from 1940, his reading of Marx was incomplete. Moreover, it was perhaps even scarce, for the notion of the fetishism of goods from the Capital was superseded by the works of Lukács and by the texts of Adorno and Horkheimer. In his writings on Marx, he limited his "heretical interventions" with the theological appendage of messianic materialism to Marx's political writings on class struggle in France and his reading of the 18th Brumaire of Luis Bonaparte. Therefore, his notion of dialectics in a strict philosophical sense must be revised.

The problem stems from the assumption that Benjamin's image already replaces language by inventing the "assembly principle in history". Moreover, that means the image shows what the language is planning for. Taking into account the thought structure of Hegel's and Marx's dialectics of history, in Benjamin's case, the notion of „dialectical images“ not only replaces the mediation of language in the telling of history. Instead, the image offers the immediacy of experience. This happens as the construction of the system of thinking of history in thesis-antithesis-synthesis (Hegel), and the destruction of the idealistic matrix of such thinking in the movement of the thing itself in reality as commodity-money-capital (Marx) stops in memory (phantasmagoria). The „dialectical image“ is so much post-historic, for it assumes that the fury of progress should be historically complete in concept and idea. Benjamin therefore seeks to dissolve the idea of progress in the dialectical form of Hegel and Marx as an endless development of the potential of science and technology into an infinite future, thereby reversing the direction of the dialectic. Instead of moving forward, the reverse is now moving toward the past. It has not passed; rather, it is being reconstructed and preserved by the "revolutionary" change in the notion of modernity. In one place in Theses on the Philosophy of History from 1940, we found the keystone of Benjamin's entire "dialectic of standstill" (Dialektik der Stillstand). (Tiedemann 1983) The 14th thesis states:

"Origin is the goal.

─ Karl Kraus, Worte in Versen, Vol. I H

History is the subject of the structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the Now (Jetztzeit). Thus, for Robespierre, ancient Rome was a past charged with the time of now, which he blasted out of history's continuum. The French Revolution viewed itself as Rome reincarnating. It evoked ancient Rome the way fashion evokes costumes of the past. Fashion has a flair for the topical; no matter where it stirs in the thickets of long ago, it is a tiger leap into the past. This jump, however, takes place in an arena where the ruling class gives the commands. The same leap in the open air of history is the dialectical one, which is how Marx understood the revolution.” (Benjamin, 1968: 261)

Since primordial is the goal, then everything should be in the sign of the antinomy of history. And this must be shown on the horizon of dialectics in Marx's footsteps. If, however, it is already stated in the 13th thesis from the same text that the concept of "the historical progress of mankind in history cannot be sundered from the concept of its progression through a homogeneous, empty time" (Benjamin, 1968: 261), then, there is the insight that the critique of progress must also be the critique of thinking that rests on the idea of ​​the infinite progress of history. As we have seen in many Arcades Project/Das Pasagen-Werk fragments, the problem with the idea of ​​progress cannot be confined to believing in the infinity of perfecting the human faculties of mind and feeling like the purpose of movement (télos). Nietzsche's conception of "eternal recurrence" of the same=Being, therefore, represents a point of reorientation. Of course, Benjamin is not a Nietzschean, nor is he a "dialectical Marxist" of vulgar orientation, but above all, a thinker who sees the materialistic idea of ​​history as "profane illumination" that Marx'Marxght of an as revolutionary event in the essence of capitalism is nothing more than a reversed future from progress to the development of what is at the core of the primordial. Now, therefore, the time of events flowing from the reversal of history is reversible. We do not go back to experience the past experiences of humanity because it would be tantamount to reliving the tragedy/comedy of the human accident in history. What is necessary to move on denotes a shift in understanding the "homogeneous and empty time" of modernity of capitalism as the highest stage of social alienation of man. It is only from here that one can understand why, through the choice of the utterly astounding, paradoxical and operatic figure of the "dialectical image" as a "tiger leap into the past," he performs something truly uncanny "new" and in fact, albeit on the verge of mysticism and theological-political provocation. We can name this matter as an understanding that Tiedemann rightly refers to Benjamin's analysis of late thinking as a " standstill". Images that are directed toward the immediacy of the experience of progress as the eternal recurrence (same=Being) are images of phantasmagoria. Here the past prevails over the future only if we understand the past as what is irreversibly gone and lost in time. But the dialectical image stops the flow of history in a linear catastrophe of progress. Everything happens in an almost photographic "flash". That is why the understanding discussed here represents Benjamin's answer to the problem of the relationship between vulgar and authentic times of human history. Without memory and reconstruction of the past with the help of archives, museums, libraries, and all modern time-stopping devices in the image as a language of a different memory, there is no possibility of a radical turn in the coming events of a changing world. Melancholy denotes therefore for Benjamin an image-figure of a revolutionary event of thought, not mourning for the irreversibly lost past.

1.6. Dialectical images

How should we explain the relationship between historical time and images? First, for Benjamin, a vulgar time of devouring or creating an irreducible life in modern capitalism belongs to the boredom of the present. However, this is not the time of knowing a series of Now-times (Jetztzeit). From time to time, to become "homogeneous and empty", one must distinguish from its vividness and uniqueness what constitutes the fury of progress in all manifestations. We can call this the time of the technological construction of life "empty homogeneity." From it arises boredom. This is a true phenomenon of freezing history in the non-movement of the pure present. The paradox, then, is that boredom is at once a condition for moving forward and for stopping time from disappearing into the black holes of nothingness. How do you explain it? Desire denotes one pole of a dialectical image. It refers to the utopian field of dreaming about the future. The other gender is aware of the "empty homogeneity" of the time of progress. In the same way, the desire for the new and its mortification are experienced as a yawning or an abyss of freedom to act. When a modern man is bored, he is captured by the disease of decadence. This is what Baudelaire calls, in prose and in the title of his book, the most accurate mark of modernity in general ─ Paris Spleen. In the reflections published under the title Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire (1927-1939), we find that the spirit of modernity (modernité) in the complete sense of the word, as opposed to the romanticism that was passive and inert, constituted the beginning of heroism. Moreover, the hero cannot be a citizen as a subject, as Marx already made evident in his early political texts, such as On the Jewish Question (Zur Judenfrage) and Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie des Rechts). (Marx and Engels 1981) Therefore, the real subject lies in the passion and determination of one who lives between the ideology of progress and the notion of eternal recurrence (the same = Being). Who else is the actual image of aesthetic modernity than a decadent artist? He can cross the boundaries between worlds. Moreover, only the artist can be bored to death by not moving what, as a machine, is dormant in history's frozen condition. (Benjamin 1999: 3-26)

The subject of modernity, however, also represents art as the production of the new. However, its essence is inhuman. Since art in modern times can only appear as aesthetic autonomy within the politically constituted sovereignty in the space of the nation-state, what links art and politics, as spheres of the decayed area of the metaphysical set of myth and religion, is inhumanity par excellence. This, then, should allow for a phantasmagoria about the "beauty" and "elevation" of Modern Arcades/Passagen. From the iron construction of the apparent power of perpetuating modernity, a new Century was born. The essence of construction is the self-production of the world through technological calculation and planning, manifest in the creation of goods. Technology, then, in its total reproducibility, reduces art to the production of new life forms and politics to the irreducibility of sovereign power to create a "state of exception" (Fenves in Benjamin, A. 2005: 60-72). Thus, we have reached modernity's extreme limit. The desire to perpetuate the inhuman as an image-fetish becomes a "dialectic at a standstill." Following on from Heidegger's Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) from 1927 and Benjamin's The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility (Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner Technischen Reproduzierbarkeit) from 1935/1936. Giorgio Agamben articulated the central concept of the production of political power at the end of modernity. When the differences between an animal, a human, and a machine are no longer at work, the "anthropological machine has entered a standstill". (Agamben 2003: 88)

In the structure of the textual network of assembly and deconstruction of the metaphysically monolithic Book as an empire of the absolute spirit (Hegel), reading the dense bundles of thoughts within the Arcades Project/Das Passagen-Werk seems like searching for what is already "here" and "now" because it gives aesthetically pleasing, transformed into a mythic jewel in the crown of the "imperial panorama" of doom. Walter Benjamin seemed to announce a time in which, through his post-historical archiving of the past, the age would be one of quotations, ornaments without function, and beauty without the man. That is why Max Pensky is right when he argues, in his analysis of the concept of "dialectical images," that it would be almost impossible to make a coherent and consistent interpretation of this oxymoron, which denotes the cornerstone of Benjamin's montage-in-history method. This is why it may seem to be "obscure." (Pensky in Benjamin, A. 2005: 178) What denotes this "obscurity"? First of all, if the understanding of the merging of the language of thought and image as an expression of that thought should be something that Benjamin seeks to lead to the self-demonstration of truth as the technological construction of the era of modern capitalism, then the first consequence might be the introduction of "dialectical images" into the work on 19th-century Paris that substantially changes the way of thinking of what traditionally corresponds to the "essence" of Being and time. We have said that the connection between the assemblage of art-politics-technology and the constellations of society-culture in Benjamin represents the inherent innovation of his thinking-writing.

It is not just a matter of supplementing or reinterpreting Marx's critique of the political economy of capitalism by making culture, instead of the economy, the new power of enchantment ─ the perversion of reality. More significantly, this turn is how Benjamin begins with the phenomenology of things as image-goods in a singularity of phantasmagoria, arriving at the universality of a possible new "event ontology" of modernity's techno-poetic essence. In this sense, the picture no longer shows what is being expressed in the language of Being in the medium of a real condition. The picture indicates a frozen moment of progress, captured in a flash. Coincidentally, the most significant contributions to the cultural sociology of media, emerging from the horizon of the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory of the 1930s, are the essays by Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin on photography and film. However, the leading medium of modernism, which corresponds to the essence of the "dialectical image" within the network of meanings of the Arcades/Das Passagen-Werk, is photography. The invention of photography creates the "loss of aura" of a work of art, marking a turning point in the entry into modernity. With it happens the mythic representation of the profane world. The event, however, occurs through the presentation of a photograph rather than the display of something "objective". The difference between the representation (representatio) of an image and its presentation (mimesis) indicates a significant difference between Being as nature (physis) and Being as the construction of the artificial world. Flash and pano features are self-explanatory for determining the photographic image in the analog age. (Benjamin 1996: 47-63; Costello in Benjamin, A. 2005: 164-184; Isenberg, 2001: 119-150).

If we look more closely at how Benjamin derives his "concepts" and "categories" as substitutes for speculative-dialectical formation from Kant to Hegel and Schelling, something exciting emerges in any further orientation toward the visual or aesthetic turn of metaphysics. Namely, "dialectical images" are simultaneously thought constructs and sensory-experiential pre-phenomena (Urphänomenen). With them comes the immediate experience of being immersed in the reality of lasting change. Through thoughtful approaches, the image of what motion indicates in conceptual architecture becomes a figuration of life. Just as photography is a momentary stopover, so is the "dialectical image," the capture of flashes of eternity. In a state of repetition of what is (a Being) by the technology of reproductive assembly-in-history, time takes on the meaning of complex uniqueness beyond the uniform forward movement. The mythic enchantment of modernity has therefore always been the demystification of its essence. How is this happening? It is simply that, instead of the protocol of the sacred, capitalism rests on the logic of steel structures and the fetishism of goods in the consumption of objects rather than in their production. This denotes a decisive difference in Marx's industrial paradigm of labor. Hence, it becomes a link between profaneness and a substitute religious cult. In the 1921 fragment "Capitalism as a Religion," we find a way of thinking that shapes the theological critique of capitalism's profaneness, through which modernity emerges as a "new cult." Religion operates in the secular age not only as a substitute for the sacred under the guise of the aesthetic and political configuration of dealing with images-fetishes of industrial production-consumption. Much more critical becomes something else. In particular, this fragment reveals capitalism's hidden origin in a medieval or theological notion of economics. In the contemporary debate over Benjamin's record of this "machine of translating" theological into political notions of the sovereignty of the new century, the proximity of Schmitt's and Benjamin's views on liberalism, secularization, and profaneness re-emerges. (Benjamin 1985: 100-103) Probably the most mystical term deriving from a series of "dialectical images" is that which refers to an attempt to understand the relationship between the Angel of history and the Messiah of events, that which belongs to the melancholy of the ruins of the past, and what is associated with the last stroke of "divine violence" beyond history. By replacing it, the secular strategy of modernity, in all its manifestations of economics, politics, and culture, rises to a proper projection of meaning in the image-creation of thought. In expressing the categorical determination of the essence of the aesthetic appearance that adorns the world of modernity, everything becomes fluid. The image of thinking is called (Denkbild) ─ profane illumination (profane Erleuchtung). We encounter this figure in Benjamin's essay titled " Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia." It examines the relationship between image and medium as action emerges from art's contemplative nature in the technological world of modernity. (Benjamin 1977: 277) between

However, the real problem Benjamin had to address was that, within the philosophical-theological tradition, the painting's mystical essence was linked to the central notion of the aesthetics of classical German idealism. Moreover, this notion seems to bind any further discussion of the relationship between Benjamin, Heidegger, and Deleuze, and of the relationship between art, politics, and technology in the planetary age of the technosphere's rule. Let us say that, right now, the materialism of Marx and Freud-Lacan psychoanalysis deals with it in a specific way, and that it also belongs to the field of consciousness and the unconscious, labor and production, cognition, and ideology. This notion is also central to early Nietzsche. At the level of the Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of the Music (Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geist der Musik) from 1872, a picture appears and masks the truth, and quite another discourse of communication for the digital age, Vilém Flusser introduces in its programmatic view of digital illusion (Digitaler Schein). (Flusser 2005: 202-215) Indeed, without Schein, there is no idea of ​​beauty, cognition, truth, the authenticity of Being, and a temporal aesthetic way of thinking. In the case of Benjamin's alternative materialist historiography on the principles of the enchantment-disenchantment of reality, the whole project of montage-in-history and critique of the ideology of modern capitalism would remain an improbable attempt to grasp the hidden essence of a system of life production that constructs the world in the play of truth of appearance and its necessary illusion. Therefore, without illusion, there is no possibility of "illumination". What determines the relation between "profane illumination" and illusion as a phantasmagoria? First, the transformation of terms from a speculative-dialectical language into a figural-dialectical game of montage-in-history must be understood as much from the turn of the research method as from the turning of the system into the heteronomy of the happenings of the very thing of life. The image replaces the language. But only through the connection of the assemblage and the constellation of relations. This means that the law of causality, as the overriding principle of cognition of "necessity," falls within the category of "progress". Instead, we face a new approach to the critique of ideology. This is now a critique of the causal determinism of Hegel's and Marx's conception of history. Apparition denotes, paradoxically, a necessary condition for truth: its openness of perspective as a manifestation of a visual play between the phenomenon and the experience of reality in the sign of enchantment-disenchantment. In the rigorous metaphysical framework from Aristotle to Hegel, Being conceals itself. The medium of his showing belongs to the manifest essence of the Being itself. It occurs through two modes: presence-absence (parousia-anousia). If the Being is not concealed, there would be no difference between the profane and the sacred, the divine and the human. This means that metaphysics would have no reason to exist. Recall that Heidegger's key concept of oblivion is the Being (Vergessenheit des Seins) of 1927 in Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) in connection with the historical and epochal events of the emergence of metaphysics. There would not be a "necessary" and "innate" man if the memory of being could not emerge through the main ecstasy of time, such as presence (ousia). Hence, the ontological difference between Being and beings represents a condition for the possibility of a metaphysical history of Being in general as a history of onto-theological thinking. The paradoxes and appearance of what Benjamin thinks of as he sets out to build a new and alternative version of history on the foundations of historical materialism and Jewish messianism, conditional on philosophy and theology, are manifested where an antinomian dispute of faith in progress and the notion of "eternal recurrence" occurs. Add to this: what truly drives the "anthropological machine" of modernity is nothing but the desire for the "new" and the need to return to "primordial," which is indicated as the "goal."

However, in the technological age of modernity, the metaphysical persistence of Being occurs by making social relations between things into natural ties between people. This is Marx's insight into ideology as a perversion of social relations in capitalism. (Sutlić 1967) However, this does not mean the absence of awareness of the reasons for the perversion whereby the false or apparent becomes true, and of the authentic and primordial retreat into oblivion before the pseudo-truth of the inverted world. Based on the rule of exchange value logic, which denotes the real reason for the existence of "commodity fetishism", everything becomes phantasmagoria. The secret of ideology is therefore precisely in the necessary action of the illusion of Being itself as an assemblage of art-politics-technology and a constellation of relations of society-culture. If the illusion arises with the emergence of a perverted version of history as a disaster, then it will be pretty apparent to Benjamin that different versions of actual history must be possible. Moreover, it only requires Messianic thinking, as commanded by Nietzsche in The Use and Abuse of History, which Benjamin cites at the beginning of the 12th Theses:

"We need history, but not the way a spoiled loafer

In the garden of knowledge, it needs it.” (Benjamin, 1968: 260)

1.7. About the Occult Power of Profanity

Ideology, therefore, is a term that originated in the modern industrial period of economy-politics-culture. But it has its origins in the emergence of an order of social relations that gives capitalism the characteristics of the most advanced system of organization of human life in history so far. The reason is that it is based on the perpetuation of "semblance" as truth and phantasmagoria as reality. By changing places and reversing the metaphysical rank of the thing itself (das Ding selbst), life becomes the means of some uncanny purposes. About this structural perversion, Marx spoke of the necessity of mystification within the very process of the circulation of goods from the abstract sphere of things inintohe the concrete sphere of mediation. When money becomes capital and capital becomes the essence of the whole organization of life in modern societies, we find ourselves in a vicious circle of the transformation of nature-society-culture. In the re-orientation of dialectics from the field of social relations between things to the cultural constellations of the pictorial power of the illusion of creating goods, there is necessarily a passage between the two. One is the historical definition of progress as a disaster, and the other represents the Messianic definition of the event of the end of history by the very essence of "eternal recurrence“ (the same=Being). In the gap between the two powers of crystallization of "truth", a process of mystification and demystification of the ideology of the capitalist modern world takes place. At stake, then, is the relationship between power and knowledge about how to master the world. It seems as if there are no antinomies without modernity. To this, I must add that without paradoxes and aporias there is no escape from the magical embrace of a new approach to explaining its ambiguity. Why? The reason is that thinking is not about Being as a mere description or expression, but as pointing to what is happening in becoming. Without a relationshibetweenof movement and rest, it should be impossible to derive what Benjamin does when he introduces figures instead of terms such as "profane illumination" and "dialectical image." A whole new categorical apparatus from 1924-to 1940 was derived from the European avant-garde and surrealism as an artistic movement on the edge of the worlds: from Baudelaire, Kafka, Proust to the Arcades Project/Das Passagen-work and recent philosophical and theological fragments.

Let us remember that the historical avant-garde movement had three prominent formations: (1) Russian futurism and constructivism; (2) Berlin's Dadaism; (3) Parisian surrealism. The first emphasizes the idea of ​​the social formation of the world as a participant machine of life; in the second, it is about performative corporeality as a connection between primordial sound and freedom; in the third, it is all about the unconscious production of the desire to create something new from the spirit of daydreaming. (Tiedemann 1973: 138-146) All three are unique in their singularity and at the same time universal in their desire to transform life with art by giving it a glow of beauty and the appearance of a new sublime. In between lies the dark river of "downtime/standstill". The avant-garde, as a continuation of modernism by other means, or as a radical turn of being modernity within its matrix of action, was not merely the realization of the scientific and technological possibilities of thought to the stage of the disappearance of a man from art by his transformation into a "thing." What was the program of this transubstantiation from the living to the inanimate, from the idea of ​​"life" to the concept of ​​"machine" in its ultimate intentions denotes the self-production of cognitive corporeality of images. This is the end of the metaphysics of speech and the beginning of a "new primordial". The call of primordial chaos and the rational mysticism of machines ─ Fernando Pessoa, in a futuristic phase of his poetry, sang: I want to be a machine! ─ We found a common "image" in the symbolic construction of crossing all moral, political, and ideological boundaries, except for the last one. Namely, the avant-garde sought to overcome (Aufhebung) dialectically. The idea of overwriting art in life as an ecstatic breakthrough of mass and energy was present from the Russian constructivists in the 1920s to the French situationists in the 1960s. At the end of history, Hegel's machine of endless advancement of spirit looks back, remembering all that has gone by with a glance at the "catalog of images" of the past. Benjamin's backward glance represents the hidden essence of the Messianic politics of events. It is not directed toward avant-garde movements in 20th-century art and politics, but rather back into the past. This should precisely be the reason for the overall shift in modern thinking. It is well known that it began with Heidegger and his destruction of the traditional ontology in Being and Time (Sein und Zeit). The return to the primordial does not signify the pursuit of "nostalgia for the absolute" (Georg Steiner). On the contrary, it is only with a different understanding of the relationship between the present in the signs of unconditional progress and the past that imposes the stamp of redemption on the future that a new chapter can be opened in the historical sequence of development. To restore dignity is to bring about what is, however, forthcoming. However, the direction from which it comes cannot be predetermined. It occurs with a contingent “profane illumination” event.

In explaining the use of the word "phantasmagoria", Benjamin refers to the blindness of the subject. The occult power of profanity radiates from it. (Agamben 2007) However, the other side has the same effect on participants in a common consumption rite as a secularized ritual of idolatry to the fetish. This creates an awareness of the illusion without which there is no admiration for the "beauty" and "exaltation" of the new world. Baudelaire constantly measures it with antiquity. Moreover, in this proportion, it raises "high modernism" to the throne of absolute truth. Perhaps this is why modernity is so anxious about the autonomy of its realms. What is without foundation in an uncanny way establishes anything else. At first glance, it is already apparent that capital presupposes a constant transformation of society-culture. So, it shows only that the history of humanity denotes the result of the process of the destruction of Being. Benjamin calls it "ruins, and it is a well-known statement from the 7th Thesis:

"There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism." (Benjamin, 1968 p. 256)

New temples of unconditional scientific and technological progress rise on their remnants. Thanks to the turn toward vulgar, materialistic conceptions of history, which cast the past as a model for the present or reduced it to the promise of the paradise gardens of the future, the aesthetic notion of the world became political at the same time. However, with one crucial complement: it is a Messianic event of entering history through a niche of the last hours, through the flash of eternity (Theses 18B):

„The soothsayers who found out from time what it had in store did not certainly experience time as either homogeneous or empty. Anyone who keeps this in mind will perhaps get an idea of ​​how past times were experienced in remembrance ─ namely, in just the same way. We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future. The Torah and the prayers instruct them in remembrance, however. This stripped the future of its magic, to which all those who turn to soothsayers for enlightenment succumb. This does not apply, however, to the Jews, for the future turned into homogeneous, empty time. For every second was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter. (Benjamin, 1968: 264)

When Benjamin continually uses the adjectives "homogeneous" and "empty" for vulgar times, it becomes self-evident that the binary opposition to such time is found in something that should be "heterogeneous" and "fulfilling" time. Indeed, only such a time can rightfully be authentic. In the strict sense of the word, the difference between two times denotes the difference between the two notions of history. The former refers to the temporality of history as a catastrophe, a sign of the alienation and reification of man, and the latter, in turn, to what signifies the space of salvation, or the last zone of human happiness, where the power of the Messianic Law resides. Filled time versus empty is necessarily heterogeneous versus homogeneous. However, this cannot be a Manichean notion of the Messiah's last struggle with the Antichrist as in Carl Schmitt's political theology. On the contrary, the problem that puts Benjamin at the center of his late thinking is how to understand the philosophical-theological intervention of thought as montage-in-history if there is no possibility of a fateful, transversal event of radical change. The step toward the relationship between the divine and the human in connection with the messianic event determines the historical relationship not only between philosophy and theology. It is a decision about the relation between Being, as a component of art-politics-technology, and time, as a constellation of relations between society and culture, in the final stage of pictorial illusion concerning the "progress" of Western civilization.

It is by no means coincidental that in the last years of his life, Benjamin has been intensely concerned with the very problem of this "forbidden future" which denies Jews the right to hope in the historical world of disaster. Adorno cites this thought at the end of his most significant philosophical work, The Origins of the German Trauerspiel (1928): "Only for the sake of the hopeless is hope given to us." With Benjamin's melancholy messianism reaffirmed in various recent interpretations, we are primarily interested in something that stems from the space between the end of history as the history of the capitalist adventure of alienation in the inevitable catastrophe of world wars and the collapse of culture, and the coming of a saving turn. However, it does not come from the future as an actualized present, but from the very beginning. From the openness of the past that never passed in the stream of the "eternal now" (Jetztzeit), history opens in a different view of life. Why is this a critical point of mediation for Benjamin's thinking? We have seen that on several occasions in the Arcades/Das Passagen-Werk fragments, and especially in the recent flurries of Historical-philosophical theses and Theological-political fragments, he sought to find a niche of entry saving in "this" history, occurring in the wake of the real catastrophe of the rule of planetary technology in the ideological-political orders of Nazism-fascism and Stalinist communism, which for him and many other critical intellectuals was a great disappointment that the USSR was emerging with the new totalitarian Leviathan.

When the hope of the salvific turn of the authentic communist revolution without the threat of freedom and slavery became a false utopia increasingly, and when the politics of violence and militarism in Europe were overtaken by the danger of total war and the extermination of Jews, Benjamin devoted himself to trying to think that would remain a glorious defeat to this day ─ radical politics of the event. It will also become a condition for the possibility of any future "weak thought" of melancholy history. So what remains in this dispute between the Angel of History and the Messiah of events represents the empty place of "culture" as a document of "barbarism". The uncanny seems to reveal that violence cannot be something beyond the Enlightenment's myth of progress. On the contrary, it belongs to the idea of history as the promise of "eternal happiness." Without it, everything would be like a tourist trip to the future through the noise and blinding of amusement parks. (Benjamin, 1999: 179-204)

 Culture, as "semblance" and "phantasmagoria," or in other words, as part of Marx's critique of political economy, necessarily appears in the form and discourse of ideology. That is why it is no longer merely the task outlined in Adorno and Horkheimer's critical theory of society. It is much more radical to note that the "culture" on which the historical order of capitalism and modernity is based denotes a phenomenology of a general logic of production of "homogeneity and emptiness." Adorno called it the cultural industry in the late 1930s in the United States. He regarded this phenomenon as a new social aspect within Marx's critique of the alienation of labor. Unlike Adorno, Benjamin has shown, in a much more complex and visionary way, how to develop, from the essence of modern technology, the pictorial or phantasmagorical order of thought on which contemporary art and even politics are based. This logic unfolds within the art-politics-technology nexus and occurs within the changing constellations of society-culture. The real task, therefore, would be to see whether Benjamin's proximity to the judgments of a whole range of thinkers and intellectuals related directly or indirectly to the program of the Critical theory of society (Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Brecht, Bloch, Kracauer) is the same as determining the notion of aura in the famous essay on the work of art in the age of technological reproducibility ─ a one-off and inevitable distance in approaching? Isn't Benjamin, despite the atmosphere and the whole discourse of social critique, already to step beyond any dialectic of progress and apology for the radical social turn in the essence of history as a materialistic, profane strategy of salvation?

1.8. Negative Kairos

His lifelong companion and friend, theologian, and author of some of the most significant studies on Jewish mysticism and messianism, Gershom Scholem states very explicitly that the materialistic background of his Marxism, with a shift to a critique of Marx's idea of ​​industrial work and historical progress, in which he inherits the Enlightenment and Hegel, must be considered from a different perspective. If the "Marxist rabbi", one whom more and more nowadays are referred to as experiencing a new revelation or mystical enlightenment, was an irreducible case of the union of two traditions in the contemporary discourse of the esoteric critique of the modern world ─ Marx's historical materialism and the theology of Jewish messianism ─ then something new is going on with the thinking. That is, admittedly, that hybrid assemblage. However, this cannot be what it seems, and yet it seeks to adopt Scholem for its own, must be admitted, a compelling interpretation:

"Everyone knows how Benjamin's Marxist writings point in a definite direction, even though no end can be seen to the discussions about the definition of the direction. One can hardly doubt Benjamin's resolve in his attempt to use the matter and terminology of the class struggle as the content not only of world history but also of philosophy.(…)That such pieces as those about Leskov, Kafka, and others destroy the legend of an unequivocal line of development in Benjamin's productivity has, as suggested above, often led to their suppression in the minds of his Marxist commentators within the New Left. That is understandable, though it does not advance a genuine understanding of Benjamin's work. Embedded in aMarxist (and vociferous) vicinity, they represent true pieces of the resistance for the reception of Benjamin that has now become fashionable.” (Scholem, 2012: 199-200)

Much more recent approaches have emerged in the spirit of Scholem's interpretation of Benjamin. They are, conditionally, moving within these two schemes: (1) the messianic time of events and (2) the mystical notion of history as "profane illumination." (Faber, 2003, pp. 68-78). In doing so, the mental connection between art and politics is singled out. Moreover, this is how the work and technological reproduction of 1935/1936 should be discussed. It sets the mediating dividing line between Benjamin's efforts to merge revolution and Messianism, a critique of progress, and the saving stroke of "divine violence" as the last seal of eternal justice. (Jacobson 2003) There is no doubt that Benjamin's approach to shrinking to one side in his thought transition to the coming epoch of the rule of the technosphere must be eliminated. This is equally true of vulgar Marxism and vulgar salvation theology. Both times are almost identical to what Benjamin himself specified in the 1935/1936 debate by aestheticizing politics and politicizing the arts. Only with this distinction, of course, do the profanity of the former and the sanctity of the latter confer on each other a legitimate right to exclusivity without distinction. The fundamental problem of this theological-messianic turn in late Benjamin's view is that, as with the "obscurity" of the term-figure of "dialectical images," the antinomies of image and language, figurativeness and discourse cannot be brought to light without prior calculations with the notion of time. The assembly does not determine the regime of the constellations in a causal order. Because of this, Benjamin's concept of time cannot be reduced to the persistence of the "present" in the measure of eternity. Being, by contrast, is conceived as a turning event in itself. From the messianic structure of the temporality of what has always "passed" but has not "passed", the actual historicity of "nature" and "spirit" comes.

We have already noted that the term constellation denotes a figure that refers to a complex web of time within the socio-cultural configuration of the art-politics-technology assembly itself. One cannot understand why Benjamin has any need for mysticism in explaining the idea of ​​a new understanding of history and time unless we see that the images of Angels and the Messiah are much more than profane-theological symbols of history as the progress and end of history as the events of the last turn of the thing at all. Moreover, introducing these religious-symbolic terms and images creates a framework for the play of illusion and truth, shadow and illumination. Everything is almost like philosophy's encounter with the spiritual experience of the irreducible Other. It is a meeting of Greco-Jewish traditions at the very heart of Western history. At the time of her tragic breakup, the magnitude of her internal dialogue is evident. Two theological approaches to time emerge. Jürgen Moltmann, the German proponent of "political theology" in the footsteps of Schmitt and Benjamin, thus distinguishes:

(1) historical continuity from past to future with a key notion of linear development;

(2) a theological discontinuity with coming from the future to the past as a messianic event. (Moltmann 1995)

In this sense, messianic time should be defined by its reversibility relative to historical time. Instead of mere hope and expectation of salvation from the future, it is a kind of "negative kairos". Benjamin speaks of it through the notion of "time-presence" (Jetztzeit). Entering through the niches of time, through the glitter of eternity into history, presupposes the possibility of mystical creation of events beyond conventional historicism. The discontinuity of time, with which the "newness" of the new in the event of divine justice is established, leads to the separation of the vulgar from authentic life. It is therefore comforting that, in Benjamin's interpretation of ​​history, philosophical and theological understandings collide and coincide. However, what seems most important here should be the distinction that Benjamin makes in the Theological-Political Fragment of 1921:

"Only the Messiah himself consummates all history, in the sense that he alone redeems, completes, creates its relation to the Messianic. For this reason, nothing historical can relate itself on its own account to anything Messianic. Therefore, the Kingdom of God is not the telos of the historical dynamic: it cannot be set as a goal. From a historical standpoint, it is not the goal but the end. Therefore, the order of the profane cannot be built up on the idea of the Divine Kingdom, and therefore theocracy has no political, but only a religious meaning.” (Benjamin, 2006: 305)

How, then, to think of a time in which modernity signifies both the end of modern faith in progress and the possibility of repeating, or the "eternal recurrence" of, what it has always been? What is different is none other than the Other in its unconditional right to rise from nothingness like a sudden stroke, a flash of messianic light. It should be restrained in analogies. We will examine how closely Benjamin's and Derrida's approaches align with the idea of a messianic politics of events. Regardless of the differences that result from Benjamin inheriting the Marxian dialectic of history and the Adorno and Horkheimer program of critical theory, Derrida inherits Heidegger's thought about the historicity of Being as an event and, in his later period, along with Lévinas in the ethical-political turn of deconstruction, correlations. (Derrida 1994) I emphasize this because, to understand modernity as a Kafkaesque pursuit of a "third country" between the dystopia of the present and the utopia of Canaan, we must open a different path of thought than traditional philosophy and theology. How? Pursuing what is fundamentally different from the entire thinking and writing tradition of modernity requires that Benjamin's interpretation not be determined in a closed circle of adaptation and the temptation of "actualization." That would be simply inappropriate to the magnitude of his absolute novelty. Moreover, it manifests itself in everything properly written and uttered by mysticism and mystery, revelation and disclosure of what constitutes the essence of modernity beyond the epochal completeness of a period in its possibilities of saying in art-politics concerning the constellation of social relations. What remains and what we dedicate ourselves to here represents the indivisible remnants of the assembly. However, so is the indivisible rest of the constellations. If art-politics boils down to the technological construction of the world in the transformation to the inhuman, then an irreducible remnant of post-industrial culture replaces society. Technology no longer applies to society. Its influence extends to culture as an emergent network of total mobilization. The end of society, therefore, signifies a change in culture's ontological place. In the Paris Arcades/Das Passagen-Werk, this change is reflected in a shift in perspective on the essence of modernity. It emanates an orientation towards "dialectical images" and figures of thought. They show what is happening (quoddittas) in the transformation of the object/thing of consumption, rather than merely describing what it is (quiddities). If so, then one should abandon the reduction of his thinking to both Marxism and Jewish Messianism in the strict sense of the word. Benjamin foreshadowed this in his fragments. The language of the melancholy idea of history expresses the essence of time so strikingly and dramatically that the three pillars of this consideration can be laid out.

1.9. „Political Theology“ and the Question of Technology

(A)

We designate a history by the object of construction. This eliminates the consideration of 'facts' and causal-teleological models of event writing within 'homogeneous and empty time'. Instead of searching through the graveyard of great obsessions of a transcendental subject of experience who sees in advance all at once from the linear scheme of the "progress" of the spirit, as in Hegel, history is elucidated at work. It is a time filled with many "small" fashion monads, advertisements, and fringe creatures of a high-class civic life in modern society. Thus, culture becomes a provision of the new economy of aestheticized consumption. An alternative version of history, however, presupposes a turn of the rank of all things. Now the focus of historical consideration cannot be grandiose and empty, but qualitatively new and filled with the complexity of life forces. Changing perspectives indicate that new conceptual tools are needed to address the phenomena of modern art, politics, and technology. The heterogeneity of life in the phantasmagoria of capitalism, and the symbolic image of progress as an eternal recurrence of the same within a cultural economy of desire, lead to a break with history understood from above. In the spirit of Nietzsche's critique of the law of causality, the possibility of absolute contingency in events now may be open. Benjamin's idea of "historical schematism" simultaneously marks the beginning of clarifying the new set and the constellations of capitalism. Directed to obey man's desire in a time of freedom from industrial labor, he rushes into the uncanny's embrace. Everything that remains of the massive notion of "civil society" and the regulation of capital as a "social relation" moves from the sphere of "nature" into the sphere of "culture". In this way, the rule of culture as a new ideology begins. Its origin lies in the total politicization of the world of life, whether it is fascism-Nazism, Stalinist communism, or liberal capitalism. Capitalism functions as a new religious cult. This means that, in the profane state of the modern world, everything appears in various forms of this structural perversion. It was not religion that became profane, but capitalism transformed itself into an order of total desacralization of life. The reign of 'semblance' and 'masks' assumes an aesthetic form in the construction of life. Afterward, it is self-evident why avant-garde art, especially surrealism, denotes a paradigmatic case of the chaotic order governing the archipelago of desires. The montage-in-history method and the invention of the term "dialectical image" as "sophisticated illumination" make it possible to stabilize this chaos and the transformations of time in the flash of the moment. When an "anthropological machine" of history is frozen, this is only a respite before a new movement into the unknown.

(B)

Revolution becomes the redemption of the past from its cognitive-ethical aberrations. This should also be understood as a critique of the past from the present and vice versa. When redemption occurs, the logic of temporal continuity is interrupted. Then the "illusion" is no longer "illusory", and the truth of the whole process of mediation in the historical progress from the first to the last (eschatology) takes on a trace of "profane illumination". What was the fundamental problem of idealistic dialectics, which is the beginning of historical events, thanks to the transformation of an idea into a spirit (Hegel) or the formation of a Being such as man into the animal rationale, is realized in the highest form of social generality, such as that of modern industrial society. If the revolution cannot be reduced to a mere change of political power within an environment of democratic power play between the ruling capitalist class and the oppressed working class, then the way of constructing the political field itself must be reversed. The turn is going in the direction from pure class violence to the sovereignty of "divine violence". In a truly eclectic way, Benjamin derived his notion of the political from an anarchist-authoritarian connection between sovereignty and the "state of exception" in the wake of Georges Sorel and Carl Schmitt. However, this could not be merely a matter of merging seemingly incompatible elements. Instead, we come to terms with the Messianic "political theology." It should be noted that the point of contention between Benjamin and Schmitt from the early 1920s to 1940, when the totalitarian order of fascism-Nazism had already conquered Europe with war, violence, and terror in conjunction with the anti-Semitic ideology of the destruction of Jews, has already been clear at the beginning of the Theological-Political Fragment :

"... therefore, theocracy has no political meaning but only religious meaning." (Benjamin, 2006, p. 305)

The political becomes a continuation of culture as a socialized spirit, but by other means. This internal turn in Marxist political theory stems from the fact that, in the twentieth century, economics took the form of total rule. Power is now legitimized by the symbolic violence of things/objects, rather than by the direct relation of capitalism's social masks. This makes the hidden origin of what would be most significant in Benjamin's „contemporary life“ ─ the insight that technological reproduction in the form of organized life as an abstract machine becomes a condition for the possibility of the aesthetic appearance of art and the sovereign order of violence of politics. The shift from a society of surveillance to a society of control (Foucault-Deleuze) at the end of the 20th century was determined by Benjamin's already fluid figural "notion".

(C)

The issue of the ontological feature of technology becomes the central question not only of the disappearance of the traditional dichotomy of society and culture but also of the causal determinism between technology and society as a relation of forces in the historical development of its forms from antiquity, the Middle Ages, to the modern and postmodern age, as well as contemporaneity. The transition from the human conditionality of technology to the inhuman management of things over man marks the turning point between mechanical technology and the cybernetic technosphere. The former rests on the law of causality, and the latter is oriented on feedback. One of the reasons why Benjamin is increasingly devoted to interpreting his view of modern technology as an assembly or dispositif, speaking Foucauldian-Deleuzean, concerning the information technology that enables the digital economy, politics, and culture, is that it must be hidden in the 20th century, which opened the problem of the constellations of issues between art and technology. Starting from the insight that the dissolution of a work of art's aura denotes a transition to the immateriality of new media, it opened a new horizon of thought. (Hansen 2004: 1-20) When there is no longer a first cause and a last purpose, the technosphere that today renders the world the techno-genetic construction of "artificial intelligence" and "artificial life" determines a kind of internal turn in philosophy and theology. Life in the age of the technosphere, we might call it, is the construction of assemblages of technological power and art-politics within the constellations of a society-culture. When the human body no longer functions and serves the "Big Other" in artificial "profane illumination" but is reconstructed and reorganized from a network of human-nonhuman traits like Kafka's transformed figure Gregor Samsa, who became an insect in a dream, an age of techno-poetical transformations emerges. It is a dreamlike network of phantasms and phantasmagorias that Benjamin finds in archives and museums, on the edges of the metropolitan area, in scraps of history. In the intertextual network of philosophy, literature, politics, and theology, what is so fluid in this world becomes an open event of the "flash" of the moment. A photographic snapshot of the current state of delayed-ruin documents is directed to the state between historical time and messianic eternity. However, this fluidity proves advantageous over the rigid signifiers of "big history." Moreover, with Benjamin's approach to the dialectic between the melancholy of history and the messianic event, we are only entering modernity. Instead of the antinomies of unconditional progress and "eternal recurrence" (the same=Being), it rests on the indeterminacy of the gap between "new" and "repetition", the boredom of homogeneity, and the endless heterogeneity of constructed life. Undoubtedly, we might call that matter just a way of unfolding assembly-in-constellations as "stability in change". 

Benjamin spoke about that in a text named Zentralpark:

"The course of history as represented in the concept of catastrophe has no more claim on the attention of the thinking than a kaleidoscope in the hand of the child, with each turn, collapses everything ordered into a new order. The justness of this image is well-founded. The concepts of the rulers have always been the mirror by means of whose image an „order“ was established. ─ This kaleidoscope must be smashed." (Benjamin,1985: 32-58; 34)

1] Margaret Cohen emphasizes three fundamental reasons why Benjamin in Arcades/Pasagen-Werk brought capitalism of modern Paris to the figure of a leading city of politics and culture at the end of the 19th century: (1) the temporality of progress that pervades all modern cultural products; (2) insight into the marginal phenomena of transience such as fashion, advertising, mass entertainment, and the utopian possibilities of fantasy; (3) a profound transformation of the arts, aesthetics and perceptual abilities of the public in the space of industrialization and commodification. All of this aligns with the beginnings of the avant-garde in the arts, meaning that the notion of time, reproduction, and phantasmagoria refers to the relation between the present as the present and the future as utopia. (Margaret Cohen in Benjamin, A. 2005: 200)

[2] The concept of the constellation should be understood as Benjamin says how under certain cosmological network of stars movement shape the image constellations (Sternbilder). This image points to the correlation between past and future. The term constellation refers to the spatial and temporal continuum. In essence, it is a principle of construction which, through the conceptual means of an idea, rules over relations between phenomena. In the early work of Walter Benjamin, especially in the Origins of the German Trauerspiel (Ursprung des deutschen Trägodie), constellations point to a sequence of temporal phenomena ranging from astrological to cosmological. The multiplicity and multiplicity of phenomena signify that they are retrieved in the fluid play of figures and images, and not from the conceptual constitution of thought systems. (Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiel, in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I-1. Frankfurt / M., 1991, 215. - "Ideas are eternal constellations and thus the elements are understood as points in given constellations and can phenomena at the same time separate and save."). See about this: Betine Menke, Das Trauerspiel-Buch: Der Souverän - das Trauerspiel. Konstellationen - Ruinen, Bielefeld, 2010. However, what makes the term constellation plastic is that it combines the reflective activities of the mind and the optical figure of the constellations. Theodor W. Adorno took over from Benjamin this term for his philosophy of new music. He applied it to Schönberg's practice of composition, and in the inaugural lecture of 1931 Die Aktualität der Philosophie uses it as a figure of "secrecy" that wraps itself in reality. In short, what sets itself the task of philosophy is to make the thought images of the constellation a useful tool for understanding the current historical constellation. (Adorno, Die Aktualität der Philosophie, in Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. I: Philosophische Schriften, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M, 1990, 335.)

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Author Profile

Žarko Paić

Žarko Paić

Žarko Paić is a Professor at the University of Zagreb, where he teaches courses in Aesthetics and Media Theory. He publishes frequently in philosophy, social sciences, and art theory. His publications include Theorizing Images, eds. with Krešimir Purgar (2016), and Technosphere Vol. 1-5 (2018-2019), White Holes and the Visualization of the Body, (2019), Neoliberalism, Oligarchy and Politics of the Event – At the Ege of Chaos (2020), Aesthetics and the Iconoclasm of Contemporary Art - Pictures Without a World (2021).

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